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IMPOLITIC REINSTATEMENTS OF DISBARRED
LAWYERS
By FRANK SWANCARA, of the Denver, Colorado, Bar
OME people intermittently criticize the few lawyers who
appear in court as counsel for persons charged with kidnapping, murder or highway robbery. In fairness to
such attorneys it should be said that they do not "defend"
criminals in any anti-social way. They but legitimately
invoke legal rules which, if applied, compel the state to produce better evidence or to conduct the prosecution more fairly.
In this end and in other respects they do no worse than their
ethical brethren who, in their civil practice, defend dishonest
clients. There are two classes of lawyers, however, that do
deserve censure: First, the few dishonest ones; and, second,
those who aid, abet, or whitewash the former in the ways
hereinafter suggested. This second group has been doing too
much in favor of disbarred attorneys who apply for reinstatement. That situation makes it timely to emphasize the
fact, or at least to submit and to defend the proposition, that
under no circumstances ought any lawyer to be restored to the
profession after a disbarment for acts of theft, embezzlement,
fraud or deceit. The victimized laymen would, without
much persuasion, agree with this thesis, but most members
of the bench and bar probably require to be reminded of, or
shown, reasons based on considerations of public policy or of
the interests of the profession before concluding that disbarments in general ought to be permanent and without hope of
reinstatement.
Heretofore a great many lawyers have
acquiesced in, and some have diligently worked for, reinstatements of even such professional outcasts as were in the category of embezzlers. In one case of a disbarred blackmailer
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"the petition for reinstatement was signed by seventy attorneys, said to include all but two of the members of the bars
of" three counties.1
The contempt for the profession, which many people feel,
is inspired or increased by the detected delinquencies of some
members, in spite of the good character of others. The public
and the private eye that can clearly see the discovered embezzler is myopic as to blameless lawyers. This is but one reason
among many for urging the permanent expulsion from the
bar of any member found dishonest either in his private or
professional capacity.
There is nothing to prevent one who is disposed to lie,
cheat or defraud from selecting the practice of the law as his
ostensible occupation. The result is that such a moral delinquent is as likely to be discoverable, as he has been, in this
profession as he is among bankers or stock salesmen.
To be successful in his deceitful attempts upon persons
of ordinary prudence he must have, as he has, the ability to
gain the confidence of his prospective or potential victims.
The art of so doing, ordinarily exercised without a specific
evil intent, also enables him to obtain the friendship of persons who never become either his actual or intended dupes.
Accordingly, it sometimes happens that a thousand or more
persons who have not defrauded are willing to testify to the
"good reputation" of some smooth and influential villain.
When they do so they possibly make inaudible or futile the
complaint of some lone sufferer from the artifices of the respectable thief.
The perpetrator of frauds deals honestly with his influential associates, not only because they are too wary to be
entrapped by any thieving scheme, but also in order that he
might on some future occasion use them as the makers of his
reputation. He cheats only some obscure persons. If he is
a lawyer, that fact gives him additional power for deceit. His
fraudulent designs are unsuspected because of the popular presumption that a member of the bar will not lie in his private
capacity. He is thought to be conforming to some stringent
system of "ethics" because his legal associates generally do.
Acting ostensibly because of a social disposition, but in fact
'See Ex parte Marshall

.Miss....

147 So. 791, 803.
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for selfish reasons, the refined and intelligent crook worms
himself into, and thereafter fortifies himself with, the friendship of the most influential persons. Consequently, it is not
surprising to find that governors of states have bestowed
favors upon persons later found guilty of confidence games.
The Supreme Court of Colorado once dealt with a case where
a disbarred attorney brazenly flaunted in its judicial face a
"pardon" issued by the chief executive of the territory.2 A
similar situation arose in Illinois, and in a New York case the
pardon was one issued by the President of the United States.3
The situation, psychological or otherwise, now sought to
be explained is illustrated by the reports of various disbarment and reinstatement proceedings. In one Oklahoma case
"judges and lawyers" testified to the "high social and moral
standing" of an applicant for reinstatement. The Supreme
Court was greatly impressed by that fact and reinstated him,
notwithstanding it had just observed that "respondent made
restitution." 4 A lawyer of any "moral standing" does not
do, nor has he done, things which call for "restitution." Such
acts ought to be expected only of common lay thieves without "social standing." The reports contain many cases where
a respondent in a disbarment proceeding or an applicant for
reinstatement has had prominent members of the bar testify
that he is "a lawyer of good reputation, of honesty and integrity." A South Dakota malefactor had also three exjudges of the Supreme Court endorse his application.5 In
one case the Supreme Court of Colorado, after striking the
name of a lawyer from the roll because of dishonest acts, immediately reinstated him for the apparent reason, among
others, that a number of eminent lawyers and judges "testify
to his good reputation." '
Naturally, the successful confidence man, whether layman
or lawyer, has a "good reputation." It is the chief instrumentality in his criminal activities. It is an easily constructed'
device for fraud, and works well provided self-serving discre'Matter of Browne, 2 Colo.
Peo. ex rel. v. George, 186
Y. S. 256.
'In re Snodgrass, 26 P. (2d)
'In re Egan, 218, N. W. 1.
'Peo. v. Essington, 32 Colo.

553, 558.
Il. 122, 57 N. E. 804; In re Kaufmann, 211 N.
756.
168, 171, 75 P. 394.
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tion is: used, or expedient delay taken, in the selection of victims. The court in the case last cited said of the delinquent
attorney:
"His conduct has been exemplary except in
the instances charged in the information."
The conduct of any occasional criminal is "exemplary except
in the instances" where the criminality is manifested.
Some bar associations resist reinstatements, but others,
neglecting the functions they are presumed to perform, sometimes exert themselves to the utmost to procure the reinstatement of some previously expelled member. Tending to be
illustrative in this connection is a case where the reinstatement of an attorney disbarred for embezzlement was unanimously recommended by the Bar Association of Kent County,
Delaware.7 The beneficiary of such a favor was a self-confessed embezzler of the funds of an estate. As might be
expected, the malefactor was fervidly represented to the court
as one reformed and as "a person of integrity and good character." If a bar association is disposed to eulogize and coddle
its socially prominent criminals, instead of purging itself of
them, the public is justified in holding the entire group in
contempt, and would be stupid to do otherwise.
It may be of interest to note that the "prominent lawyers" who willingly devote both time and energy toward
restoring embezzlers to the bar never contribute to a restitution fund for the benefit of the parties betrayed, injured or
ruined by the applicant whose petition for reinstatement they
endorse. They do not even pause to inquire as to the condition or wishes of the persons who suffered at the hands of the
swindler. Possibly among such "busy" class-conscious lawyers were those who could not spare five minutes towards
helping to find a position for a law school graduate who has
no "eminent" uncle already in the profession.
The "good reputation" of the embezzler applying for
reinstatement does not assuage the misery of those who bore
the loss, especially when the stolen funds become needed for
immediate medical attention or emergent hospital care. To
them the bar's solicitude and a court's compassion for the
respectable thief is an insult added to the injury already re'In re Hawkins, 87 At. 243.
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ceived. Naturally they are thereafter disposed to assist in
creating public sentiment against the entire legal "crew."
They are excusable in surmising that the numerous lawyers
who offered testimonials in favor of the miscreant did so
because of consciousness of secret guilt of similar misconduct.
The defrauded clients or betrayed associates are not in a poetic
mood and derive no comfort from the fact that some judge,
in reinstating the disbarred attorney, gazes upon the culprit
with a benign countenance and recites:
"The quality of mercy is not strained;
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath; it is twice blestIt blesseth him that gives and him that takes..
To the victims such expression from the bench is but a vain
hoot of a judicial owl.
If any one group of citizens ought to be depended upon
to support deserved disbarments and to resist the reinstatement of corrupt disbarred attorneys it is the committee on
grievances of any bar association, yet cases may be found
where even such a presumably strict vigilante group has recommended reinstatements. Sometimes, as if ashamed to take
all the responsibility, it procures and submits also endorsements from bankers and businessmen. Again, it may evasively recommend a "reinstatement on probation."
It may be of interest to note that often when a court disbars a lawyer there is a loud blare of the judicial trumpets,
proclaiming the necessity that a member of the bar shall
"demean himself with scrupulous propriety." In at least a
few cases, however, when a few months later the expelled
malefactor stealthily creeps back to the same tribunal with a
petition for reinstatement, appearing with a formidable array
of counsel and furnishing the court with a cartload of testimonials from "eminent" lawyers and ambitious politicians,
reinstatement is granted "without written opinion." What
was once properly done with commendable private and official pride, and publicly explained, seems in some cases to be
later undone, secretly and silently.
The courts that have the power to reinstate naturally feel
the pressure of such bar association action as was manifested
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in the Delaware case, and naturally consider testimonials
from lawyers and laymen. If they yield to such persuasion
they are not as much at fault as the attorneys who support
the petition for reinstatement. But, to their great credit,
many such tribunals do not always surrender their common
sense or appreciation of justice. 48 A. L. R. 1236, 1240,
cites many cases where a reinstatement was denied. A New
York court refused to conform to the wishes of "many prominent lawyers" to reinstate a man who "did not deny the
charges against him, culpable as they were." 8 A California
court denied reinstatement to a convicted embezzler who had
received "a full pardon by the governor" and submitted to
the court "numerous testimonials from officials and other
persons." 9
So great has been the pressure brought to bear upon courts
in behalf of disbarred embezzlers who had "friends" in the
pulpits, in the Chamber of Commerce, and at the bar, that
the judges have tried in some instances to counteract it by
formulating rules regarding the sufficiency of the proof of the
alleged "good character" at the time of the petition for reinstatement."0 But generally the test applied was altogether
too easy for the petitioner pretending repentance and reformation. In substance, it was, and is, if restored to the bar will
he be upright? 1 The result has been that one outspoken
jurist could say:1"
"We have refused to disbar and have reinstated men who
betrayed their clients. We have refused to disbar and have
reinstated men who stole their clients' funds. We have refused to disbar and have reinstated men who bear the felon's
brand. We have shown mercy to men whose acts were dishonorable and reprehensible. We have shown mercy to men
whose acts made black the escutcheon of the bar."
Occasionally a court is hard pressed for reasons with
which to justify an order of reinstatement. Thus in one case
the Supreme Court of Montana found that "no reason exists
the
why the applicant should not be reinstated," because "...
'Matter of Clark, 112 N. Y. S. 777.
'In re Riccardi, 64 Cal. App. 791, 222 Pac. 625 (1923).
"*6 C. J. 615, note 84.
116 C. J. 615. note 81.
"Hilliard, J. in Peo. v. Lindsey, 93 Colo. 41, 58.
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larceny upon conviction of which the petitioner was disbarred was committed while the petitioner was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor," and "since
' 13 the order of disbarment was made he has become sober.
Reinstatements are sometimes granted, not on the court's
independent consideration of the application, but because of
recommendations of a bar association. Thus in a New Jersey case the applicant had been guilty of many thieving and
disreputable acts. 14 He had been convicted in a criminal court
of the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses, and
at the time of his application had not made full restitution to
his victim. 5 The court reinstated him chiefly because the
Camden County Bar Association, "after a thorough investigation, unanimously asked for his reinstatement."
The
"thorough investigation" did not disclose that the applicant
had not obtained money by false pretenses, and had not embezzled monies at various times. His failure to make restitution was said to be due to inability. The bar association
ignored the question whether applicant could have foreseen
such inability at the time of the larcenous acts. If a full
restitution had been made, that fact would have been seized
upon as an additional reason for reinstatement. The court
itself found a way to evade the obvious converse of the situation. It quoted from a Delaware decision where, in a like
case, it was said that a "thoroughly good man may be unable
to make any restitution at all." It may be submitted that if
one is under a legal or moral obligation to make a "restitution" of stolen funds, that very obligation precludes the possibility that he is "a thoroughly good man." As well say
that a "thoroughly good man" is unable to bring back to life
one whom he has murdered. One hundred and twenty-five
witnesses testified for the applicant. One was a "former
judge," another a "Congressman." The report is instructive
to prospective wrongdoers. It teaches them not to steal from
a "judge" or a "Congressman," but rather to victimize some
obscure widow. Her feeble cries of distress will be drowned
out by the vociferous testimonials of lawyers, judges, busi"In re Newton, 70 Pac. 982.
"In re Harris, 66 N. J. Law 473, 49 Atd. 728.
"In re Harris. 88 N. J. Law 18. 95 At. 761.
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nessmen, and Congressmen. Why so much solicitude for a
lawyer thief? No array of attorneys and politicians rush to
the aid of a shopgirl who steals a ribbon. There is no reinstatement for her, even if her employer is one of the businessmen who comes to the aid of a thieving lawyer.
It may be of interest to note that among the things which
influenced courts to exercise "discretion" in favor of a reinstatement is a situation indicated in the following words of a
brief quoted by the Oklahoma court:
"His father was a distinguished lawyer; his
family for several hundred years back have been in
the legal profession."
Ordinarily such a fact ought to militate against the applicant, and the court should terminate the local professional
dynasty. We have no Mongolian system of caste. If this is
a land of equal opportunity an applicant for reinstatement
ought to be in a better position if his counsel is able to say:
"His father was a lazy section hand; his family for several hundred years back have been without education or property."
Sometimes when a court restores to the profession a disbarred blackmailer or embezzler it professes to believe "that
men are, and may be, rehabilitated when they have yielded to
What is thus
temptation, when they have repented."'"
assumed by them is but a half-truth. Persons guilty of some
crimes may be "rehabilitated." Reinstatements may be justly
granted in cases where disbarment resulted from intemperance, negligence, crimes of passion, or strong language in
books or briefs. Emotional instability is curable or at least
excusable in most cases, but the disposition to cheat generally
is not. Dishonesty in an educated adult is a permanent yellow streak in his psychic constitution, but even if not, disbarment resulting from it ought to be permanent. Ordinarily, if the guilty lawyer fears to renew fraudulent practices
by overt acts he is apt to do so vicariously by advising selfish
clients how to commit frauds without detection or punishment.
"See Ex parte Marshall, 147 So. 791. 794.
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The intelligent lawyer of mature years who has been
found flagrantly dishonest on one occasion is forever prone
to relapse into delinquency and remains potentially a worse
miscreant, notwithstanding that the contrary may be assumed
in what is tearfully said about him in a subsequent memorial
meeting of a bar association. It is a curious fact, psychological or otherwise, that untruthful and dishonest persons who
observe that numerous friends believe in, and are sincerely
testifying to, their "honesty and integrity," yield to the suggestion and become unconscious of their own turpitude or
moral instability. In 1902 a Montana lawyer was disbarred
for fraud and deceit. One year thereafter he asked to be reinstated. The court then observed that his petition "does not
state anything which shows that the applicant has a just conception of the serious nature of the several charges made and
proven against him, or that he in anywise regrets having
done any of the things which he did." 17 That characterization almost typifies the psychology of one kind of a respectable
crook. After participating in, or creating, a fraudulent transaction he proceeds to conceive a series of ideas which convince
him of self-justification and ultimately overcome all sense of
guilt. Thus the embezzler can face the world with an air of
innocence after a little loose thinking or imagination on his
part that at the time of the theft he intended to make restitution before detection, or that at the time of the deceit he
did not acutely realize that he was perpetrating an injurious
falsehood. He may deem himself guiltless because he is financially unable to meet a legal or moral claim, evading thought
of the fact that at the time the obligation was entered into he
knew that such inability was imminent or already present,
and concealed that material circumstance from the one with
whom he dealt. It is possible, also, for a refined crook to
induce a sense of self-righteousness by doing a little charitable
work or performing some kind acts. Such incidental conduct serves not only as a jag which deadens the consciousness
of wrongs committed but also as an exhibit in proof of a good
character. The "reputation" thus bolstered up may be utilized to camouflage further fraudulent intents or to escape the
consequences of detected misdoings. If caught in the com"In re Weed, 72 Pac. 653.
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mission of a good sized theft or extortion so that the "reputation" fails to work as an immunity bath, there may be a
plea of "a. nervous breakdown" and a few friendly physicians
and psychiatrists then do the whitewashing.
When "eminent lawyers" testify to the "good character"
of some ex-thief they desire to have restored to their ranks,
they may be sincere, but let it be remembered that they would
have had the same testimony, had it been called for, prior to
the time of the criminal or dishonest acts which resulted in
the disbarment.
A common motivation for a court's refusal to disbar a
dishonest lawyer or for ordering the reinstatement of one
already disbarred, is the sympathetic desire that he be permitted to earn money in the way in which he has been trained,
presumably in order that he might not become "poor." But
poverty has been the condition of many honest lawyers while
in active practice as well as in their declining years. Embezzlers are not made of such finer clay that ways of affluence
must be provided for them. Most of the disbarred do not
actually suffer when no petition for reinstatement is pending.
They evade the soup line. Many of them are given good
positions by some of the "eminent" lawyers who afterwards
clamor for their reinstatement. In one reported case the court
observed that an applicant for reinstatement "has been in the
employment, as general assistant and confidential managing
clerk" of a prominent law firm.
The disbarred lawyers do not seem to be satisfied with
subordinate positions with practicing attorneys. They want
to be "big shots" in the estimation of the general public. But
they are not too good for mere "jobs." Many lawyers abler
than they are simply associated with some attorney or firm.
Dishonest men are not worthy even to be messengers in a
law office. However able, they are not needed in any capacity,
in the light of the fact that the law schools are furnishing
many able young men with high ideals and who are capable
of filling any legal position or practicing law alone.
Ways are being sought to prevent the profession from
being overcrowded. It is unfair arbitrarily to "flunk" any
competent law school graduates who take a bar examination.
However less expedient, it would be more just to weed out
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the dishonest practitioners, if any there are, regardless of age
or ability. There is no way of doing this effectively because
the unscrupulous lawyers are clever enough to conceal their
moral obliquity from upright associates. What can be done,
however, is to encourage betrayed clients to make complaints,
and to urge laymen who have been defrauded by any lawyer
to disclose their respective experiences. It is timely, also, for
those able to be heard, to denounce the practice of attempting
to undo a deserved and belated disbarment by endorsing a
petition for reinstatement. A good start in that direction
was made by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin when it rebuked
the sixty lawyers of Dane county for filing a petition, ostensibly as friends of the court, in behalf of an accused in a disbarment proceeding. 8 The Supreme Court of South Dakota, when deluged by testimonials, cited that case with approval and pointed out that lawyers who sign petitions in
favor of reinstatement, merely because of sympathy for the
applicant, are "unmindful of their obligations as attorneys
and officers" of the court."9
"In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N. W. 379 (1927).
"In re Egan, 52 S. D. 394, 218 N. W. 1, 15 (1928).

ANOTHER WAY TO ELEVATE THE BAR
By BENTLEY M. MCMULLIN, of the Denver Bar

HE apotheosis of formal legal education still continues.
Cunningly prepared tracts plead that every state grant
admission to the bar only after three years in an approved
law school, with a prior college course. Mapped in purest
white are those loyal sovereignties meeting these requirements,
in shaded tones those which have compromised with their
ideals, in solid black the recalcitrants which have utterly
failed. The claim is made that compliance will produce a bar
better able to dispense law, freer from objectionable characters, of greater social value, and, though unexpressed, the
thought may also be present that competition will be lessened.
Without stopping to deny the claims of the newspapers and
our own clients that we lack learning, ability and conscience,

